

Developing attitude: An ontogenetic perspective on APPRAISAL

CLARE PAINTER

Abstract

Within SFL and other approaches to early child language, the predominant emphasis with respect to 'interpersonal' meaning has up till now been with the infant's proto-'speech acts' and their development into conversational exchange. This article argues for broadening our consideration of the interpersonal in language development to include the emergence of evaluative and attitudinal language. To do this, naturalistic case study data from children aged between nine months and four years is examined, using Martin's (2000) appraisal analysis as an informing theoretical framework. It is argued that language itself should be recognized as founded upon affectual beginnings and that the earliest 'protolanguage' phase can be construed as a system of semiotized affect. Following from this, the article tracks the development of two children's resources for expressing emotional, moral and other evaluations, examines the interplay of implicit (evoked) and explicit (inscribed) attitudinal construals in mother-child talk, and explores the role of ATTITUDE¹ in language development generally. With respect to the latter, it is argued that apparently impersonal areas such as causal relations and generalizations arise initially from the impetus to share 'attitude'. The enterprise of construing experience in the evaluative terms relevant to the meaning group is thus central to the child's endeavor of learning the mother tongue.

Keywords: systemic-functional linguistics (SFL); child language; appraisal; evaluative language; case study.

1. Introduction

Over the past decade or two, from both the traditions of text oriented linguistics and of philosophical linguistics, there has been renewed interest in language as a system for adopting or presenting a 'stance' in relation to the content of what is being talked about. (See for example, Biber and Finnegan

1989; Ellis 1993). Within systemic-functional linguistics (SFL), the idea that a speaker always adopts a position in relation to the addressee and a stance in relation to what is said is a longstanding and fundamental one, modeled in terms of an 'interpersonal' linguistic resource that is always in play when the parallel 'ideational' one construes meaning. This aspect of the theoretical model has been further illuminated by SFL case studies of language development, detailing the ontogenesis of dialog, whereby 'content' is construed as information for exchange. (see, for example, Halliday 1984a).

More recent work within SFL, however, has focused on aspects of interpersonal meaning apart from the grammar of dialogic exchange, and this article will reconsider developmental data in the light of this broader perspective. In particular, it is Martin's (2000) work on APPRAISAL that will underpin this exploration, focusing on the system of ATTITUDE—a domain concerned with the linguistic expression of positive and negative evaluations. An examination of the ontogenesis of the ATTITUDE system should throw light not only on the place of verbalizing ATTITUDE in the language development process, but the kinds of experience that get appraised in early childhood, and the relevance of Martin's proposed sub-categories when considering very early speech.

The account of initial language-learning to be presented here will principally use audiotaped data and field notes from naturalistic case studies of the language development of my two sons in the first few years of their lives. One study began when the first child, Hal, was seven months of age, continuing up to age of two-and-a-half, while the second study began when his brother Stephen was two-and-a-half and continued to the age of five (though no data beyond the age of four will be considered here). The children were unaware of being recorded and the data comprise transcripts of unmonitored, everyday conversations, chiefly with other family members in a variety of situations. (See Painter 1984, 1999 for further details of data collection). These data, together with published longitudinal material from Halliday (1975, 1984b) and Torr (1997), will be used here to describe the ontogenesis of the linguistic resources for taking an evaluative stance on experience.

2. The protolanguage: Symbols for affect

The linguistic domain of APPRAISAL, in Martin's analysis, comprises the system of ATTITUDE, together with parallel systems of GRADUATION (which fine-tunes the meaning) and ENGAGEMENT (which manages dialogism). As it is part of the semantics of English, APPRAISAL can only be expected to emerge at about eighteen months of age with the child's first words. However, SFL accounts of language have pointed to the importance of an

Table 1. *Halliday's functional interpretation of early symbols*

Microfunction	Meaning gloss
Instrumental	'I want that—give me'
Regulatory	'I like that—you do it'
Interactional	'you and me together'
Personal	'that's interesting'

earlier developmental moment at about nine months of age, which heralds the beginning of what Halliday has called the 'protolanguage' phase or, in Bates's terms, 'the acquisition of performatives' (Bates et al. 1975). At this point, infants may be observed in the systematic use of gestures and/or vocal sounds of their own devising. These facilitate interaction with significant others by focusing joint attention on the things and events of their shared environment (Trevarthen and Hubley 1978; Trevarthen 1998). For example, Halliday's son, Nigel, at the age of ten-and-a-half months, consistently uttered the sound [dø] in contexts that could be interpreted as a greeting and invitation to the caregiver to share attention to something, such as a picture (Halliday 1975: 23).

The protolanguage phase has chiefly been of interest to developmental psychologists and functional linguists in terms of the communicative functions of the infant's sounds or gestures (Blake 2000: ch. 2). Table 1, for example, shows the four functions proposed by Halliday (1975, 1992) as constituting the basic meanings initially negotiated by children in interaction with significant others. Halliday's analysis has proved a revealing one in terms of mapping the child's shift into the clause grammar of the mother tongue, particularly in terms of mood.² However, if we are interested in the less grammaticalized interpersonal region of APPRAISAL, and look for its ontogenetic origins, then I would suggest that it is equally possible to foreground the fact that the initial protolinguistic symbols are also construals of the infant's feelings. Such a focus accords well with recent emphases in infancy research, which stress the emotionality of infant-caregiver interactions (Stern et al. 1985; Trevarthen 1992, 1993). In Table 2, I have added a third column to suggest that, rather than focusing

Table 2. *Early symbols as a semiotic system of affect*

Microfunction	Meaning gloss	Affect
Instrumental	'I want that—give me'	desire, frustration
Regulatory	'I like that—you do it'	(desire) pleasure, happiness
Interactional	'you and me together'	trust, security
Personal	'that's interesting'	interest, curiosity




Figure 1. *An early protolanguage system interpreted as a system of affect (based on Hal at ten-and-a-half months)*

solely on the communicative functions of 'primitive speech acts' (Dore 1975), we can equally interpret the infant's protolanguage as a system of semiotized affect.

To exemplify further, in Figure 1, Hal's protolanguage at the age of ten-and-a-half months is represented in this way: as a set of options for sharing affect, realized by idiosyncratic vocalizations. Labels in terms of Halliday's microfunctions have been indicated alongside. The contexts of occurrence of these signs were briefly as follows: 'desire' used to demand an object/food; 'interest' used to express or share interest in an object, 'engagement' used as a kind of greeting; 'delight' when encountering something unexpectedly pleasing; 'taste' used in enjoyment or anticipation of food/milk; 'relaxation' after having contentedly polished off a bottle of milk. More important, though, than the specific meanings construed by this child in interaction with his inner circle, is the fact that the impetus to share affect can be put forward as the ontogenetic basis of symbolizing, and so of language itself.

It should be observed that the meanings of Hal's protolanguage at the age of ten-and-a-half months do not correspond to the six or more universal emotions discussed in classic studies of neonatal infant expression, such as those by Darwin (1913) or Izard (1971), and nor is this to be expected. A protolinguistic gesture or vocalization is the expressive face for a meaning *addressed to another person*. In other words, the expression of feeling is no longer a universally recognizable bodily index of such sensations as pain, hunger or satisfaction, but the realization of an affective meaning which is achieved in negotiation with the other.

Nonetheless there is likely to be some congruence between the meanings achieved by different infants in the first year or so of life, to the extent that all share the enterprise of engaging with and learning from the environment of objects and persons and all have comparable needs for food, warmth, loving contact and sleep. Table 3 draws on three detailed studies of the protolanguage (Halliday 1975; Painter 1984; Torr 1997), and shows the range of variation in those signs that are most readily interpretable in affective terms.³ (Intensified versions have not been included). Interestingly, there is a degree of similarity not only in the meanings created, but in the fact that several expression forms are adaptations of embodied affect. For example, a grizzle is adapted for a demand sign [ə], a fricative created by a dribbly smile is adapted to a greeting [kx:], a bilabial nasal is favored for expressing appreciation of food or milk sucked through the lips [m, nŋ].

If the early protolanguage system is a system of affect, it is also one incorporating a second type of meaning in the adult semantics of appraisal—that of GRADUATION, more specifically FORCE (Martin 2000). This system amplifies or reduces the intensity of attitudinal expressions through such means as modification (*very miserable, a bit lazy, lots of fun*), repetition (*on and on and on*) and loudness. While the development of the adult system of GRADUATION will not be discussed here, it can be noted that from early on in the protolanguage one or two signs may have an intensified variant—where the syllable is repeated rapidly, or the vowel is elongated, or there is an overlay of loudness or creakiness, or an accompanying gestural component, such as foot shuffling or arm waving, or else an alternative expression altogether (see, for example, Halliday 1975: 22–3, 148–9; Painter 1984: 78, 84, 106; Torr 1997: 77). This is interesting not only in showing that the basic meaning of graduation is also part of the earliest semiotic system, along with affect, but that it makes use of many of the non-grammatical means of realizing it that persist into adult language.

3. From AFFECT to JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION: Detaching affect—a metasemiotic development

So far the protolanguage has been considered as having an affectual basis (modulated by options of GRADUATION), but AFFECT is only one of the semantic components of ATTITUDE in the adult language. Martin's (2000) analysis of appraisal argues for two further domains: those of JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION. However, since moral and aesthetic evaluations will always contain a basic opposition of positive versus negative, good versus bad, there is a sense in which affect is implicated in all kinds of attitudinal

Table 3. *Protolinguistic expressions of affect from Hal, Nigel and Anna*

Affect	Meaning gloss	First expression form	Child subject	By age of (in months)
Desire: positive	'I want that / more'	amamama'ma na ma (repeatedly)	Hal Nigel Anna	10½
	'again!!'	ə	Nigel	10½
Desire: negative	'I don't want that / to do that'	na a a	Anna Nigel	10½ 13½
	'I feel good seeing you'	kx:: (+ smile) φ; dφ	Hal Nigel	10½
Engagement	'yes it's me'	ε:	Nigel	10½
Amusement	'isn't this a joke?'	æ::hæha	Hal	13½
Regret	'lets be sad'	ʔaʔ	Nigel	16
Chagrin	'I made you cross'	<i>badboy</i>	Hal	18
		φ	Nigel	13½
Interest	'hey, that's interesting'	g a	Hal	10½
		φ	Nigel	
		tə	Anna	
Weariness	'I'm sleepy'	g ^w ʏ	Nigel	10½
Relaxation	'all's well'	gaɪgaɪgaɪ	Hal	10½
Delight	'I like that'	æ	Hal	10½
		a	Nigel	
Pleasure specific: positive	'this tastes good'	m::::	Hal	10½
		ŋ (nasals)	Nigel Anna	
Pleasure specific: negative	'this tastes bad'	<i>yuk</i>	Anna	18
Disgust	'a lot of talk!' 'that's horrible'	b ^w g ^w bug ^w (grimace + blowing)	Nigel Anna	13½ 18
		<i>mama</i>	Anna	10½
Pain	'I've hurt myself'	<i>bump</i>	Hal	18
		oʊ	Hal	13½
Surprise	'ooh!'	mŋ	Nigel	
Excitement	'I'm excited'	ε;; a;; i;; ε'ε	Anna Nigel	13½ 15
Joy	'this is special' 'my best . . .' / 'that's me'	et, εt m; ʔyi:	Hal Nigel	16½ 16½
Unhappiness	'I'm upset'	<i>mama</i> <i>oh dear</i>	Anna Hal	10½ 18
Cheek / remorse	'I'm fed up' 'doing/done prohibited deed'	ʔβεʊ ʔβεʊ ʔβεʊ <i>badboy</i>	Nigel Hal	16½ 16½
Pride	'I did it!'	dæ; <i>hooray</i>	Hal Anna	15 18
Disappointment	'I did it wrong . . .'	<i>oh dear</i>	Hal	18
Frustration	'I can't do it!'	ʔə ʔə	Anna	18




Figure 2. *The affective basis of JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION (based on Martin 2000: 147)*

appraisal. Martin in fact argues (see Figure 2) that JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION are 'institutionalizations' of affect. That is to say, an attitudinal word or other utterance need not directly express the feelings of a speaker; instead it may construe someone's behavior in positive or negative terms within a framework of social and ethical values (the system of JUDGMENT), or it may evaluate their artistic, intellectual, sporting, professional or other products and processes (the system of APPRECIATION).

Until the child begins using mother tongue words with some ideational (representational) content, there is little basis for distinguishing construals of ATTITUDE into distinct systems of AFFECT, JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION. However, looking back at the protolanguage from the perspective of the future lexical system, it is possible to identify precursors of these latter kinds of meanings. For example, both Hal (by fifteen months) and Anna (by eighteen months) developed a sign for self-satisfaction or 'pride' in relation to their own effortful behavior, which could be taken as an early construal of the self in terms of positive social esteem (i.e., JUDGMENT), though it is not the case that others could be esteemed or dis-esteemed. Similarly, it could be argued that pleasure in taste expressed by [mm] or [nŋ] is a primitive sign of APPRECIATION, in that the sign seems to appraise the food as much as the inner experience. This outward focus is true also of Nigel's [ʔaʔ], glossed in Table 3 as 'let's be sad about this'. But it would be fruitless to try to speculate as to whether the emotion or the 'appreciation' predominated in these pre-lexical symbols.

The 'institutionalization of affect' occurs only later with new semiotic steps on the child's part—either the adoption of mother tongue lexical words in lieu of protolinguistic symbols or a 'meta' awareness of the sign itself, which may emerge with the use of an 'iconic' protolanguage sign. With these moves, there is the possibility of an evaluation where the attitude coded is

applicable to other persons and/or is distinct in some way from the affectual status of the expression. This is because the ideational meaning can be 'held constant' through iconicity or lexical content.

The difference between a protolinguistic symbol—where all aspects of meaning are fused in the expression—and a lexical word can be seen in Hal's use, at about sixteen months, of the expression *badboy* (and later *naughty*) to announce that he would commit a misdeed or to confess that he had done so. The later expression *naughty* was used in relation to others, but even the earlier expression could be used with different affective overlays (indicated 'paralinguistically') ranging from high glee to quiet remorse, since its meaning was essentially to construe the transgression of a social rule, rather than simply to share an emotion. Of course, part of the point of uttering *badboy* with a huge grin while 'threatening' to do something forbidden may have been the joy of teasing the adult, but playing with language to experience this pleasure is only possible because the 'word' itself construes a negative evaluation of behavior. The system of JUDGMENT thus becomes relevant immediately when the child moves into language proper. With lexical words, the child is able not only to name behavior (with vocabulary like 'sing', 'sleep', 'break', etc.) but to evaluate it according to criteria other than how the experience feels.

Something in Hal's language that seemed to provide a similar, but earlier, possibility for evaluating rather than emoting was the creation of an iconic protolinguistic sign; that is, a sign whose expression, by its very form, transparently reveals its meaning. In the period from twelve to thirteen-and-a-half months, Hal occasionally used the sign [æ:hæha], which was a kind of 'stage laugh' rather self-consciously addressed to the other. It occurred in response to some possibly transgressive behavior (his own or someone else's) which took his fancy, such as his father blowing his nose in a trumpeting fashion, or his playmate showing off by putting his head in the toy box or himself exasperating his mother's attempts to dress him after a bath.

What is different here from other sign expressions that were adapted from sighs and grizzles is that Hal had some awareness himself of the relation between his symbolic vocalization and the unmonitored one of laughing. So turning the feeling into a symbol now was almost a *metasemiotic* act—in other words it was akin to naming it as 'amusement'. And it was as though this self-conscious creation of a sign out of the spontaneous emotional reaction of laughter was a way of 'ideationalizing' the affect—not just enacting a feeling but reflecting on it. Once done, moreover, it allowed for *misappraisal*, for using the sign to negotiate misbehavior as funny and so to create humor and deflect control.

This feature of using the sign for mis-appreciating was also shared by a later, but more prominent sign in Hal's protolanguage, which emerged at

eighteen months and was an imitation of the adult expression *oh dear*. This came to be used for situations such as the ball rolling out of reach under the chair or a failure to fit one ‘nesting’ cup inside another. While in instrumental contexts it was laden with negative affect, it could also be used humorously. For example, Hal would construct a tower of bricks and then sweep it to the floor with a grin, declaring loudly and delightedly to the addressee: *oh dear*. It is not that *oh dear* sometimes meant ‘I’m frustrated’ and sometimes ‘I’m happy’, but that it always meant ‘this is problematic’ and thus could be used on some occasions in an ironic playful way.

Protolinguistic behavior of this kind not only demonstrates the significant difference between the universal, embodied affect of the newborn and the semiotized affect of the protolanguage, but it takes the protolanguage itself a step towards a more complex semiotic. All protolinguistic meaning is contingent upon the context of occurrence of the sign, but with the interactions just described, the child playfully re-construes the context in a way only possible where the speaker has some more conscious awareness of the ‘normal’ context for interpretation (and infers that the hearer does too). Thus, while experimental work has found that children can manage aspects of irony at the age of six or seven years (Ackerman 1983), these naturalistic data show that the child has some such experience well before this, in fact from the earliest beginnings of language.

The account I have given of the protolanguage phase has suggested firstly that a child’s initial semiotic system is essentially one for sharing emotion or affect. With growing experience of symbolizing, the child is able to use symbols in a playful and imaginative way, which is possible when the unmarked contexts of use have been firmly established and/or the sign-expression itself makes the unmarked meaning clear. Where this happens at the beginning of the transition into the mother tongue, some disengagement of the emotional import of the sign becomes possible, with misconstrual deployed to further negotiate interpersonal relations and create humor. This allows the infant signer to engage in metasemiosis—reflection on the nature of the semiotic act itself—as well as enabling more differentiated forms of AFFECT to emerge, where positive and negative evaluations have relevance in terms of JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION, rather than as direct expressions of feeling.

4. The role of ATTITUDE in later language development

I have argued that the whole semiotic enterprise begins as a sharing of affect to achieve a variety of functional goals. But AFFECT does not simply kick start the child’s life as a semiotic being; repeatedly, one can see that the

impulse to share evaluations with others is a significant one in leading to new developments. Within the protolanguage we have already seen that the first attempts at linguistic humor involve misappraising experience, something that depends on shared understanding of predictable and actual affect in the context. After the transition to the mother tongue, these case studies suggest that sharing evaluations plays the further developmental role of prompting the child to give information, to construe cause-effect links and to generalize. While these aspects of development appear to be very much 'cognitive' and 'ideational' in nature, they were initiated by the children in the process of sharing ATTITUDE.

With the move out of protolanguage and into the mother tongue, children develop a semiotic with the power to name aspects of ideational experience (actions, objects, locations, etc.). However for at least some children, it takes a considerable time before they understand that language can be used not only to share verbally with another something currently or previously observed or experienced together, but to create information by telling the addressee something new to them. For Hal, it was the impulse to share his feelings that first took him in this direction. Soon after seventeen months, he had developed the 'word' *bump*, which was used in a little sympathy ritual to or by the addressee after some painful misadventure. The first occasion of this child relating information to someone who had not shared the experience occurred (aged 1;5;22) when he entered a room and said *bump* pathetically to his mother, to indicate that he had just hurt himself (Painter 1984: 108).⁴ Other rare occasions of genuine information-giving in the early months of using language were similarly affect-laden for Hal; for example, he once produced a torn up flower from the garden, confessing softly, *badboy*; on another occasion, at nineteen months, he related to his father an incident where he had pulled the cat's tail (and doubtless been admonished), telling the story: *tail, tail, tail; pussy; tail; pussy, badboy* (Painter 1984: 134). Here negative judgment was expressed lexically and negative emotion phonologically. This example also shows how, as well as information-giving, the creation of a recount though juxtaposing single words was a new achievement fuelled by the motivation of sharing and negotiating attitudes.

The second key development closely bound up with the expression of attitude is that of creating causal links. Data here come from the case study of Stephen (see Painter 1999), with Table 4 providing examples of Stephen's earliest utterances where clauses were linked—either implicitly or explicitly—in a cause-effect relationship. At the time he was aged between two-and-a-half and three years. While the nature of the causes and the effects in ideational terms was quite disparate, there was in every case a construal of attitude as the cause (and sometimes also as effect). To observe this

Table 4. Early examples of causal links by Stephen at about two-and-a-half years

Example ^a	Construal of cause
<i>Mummy start; I <u>don't want</u> to start.</i>	inscribed ^b negative affect
<i>I'm jumping 'cause I <u>like</u> jumping.</i>	inscribed positive affect
<i>I haven't got earrings 'cause <u>might hurt me</u>.</i>	inscribed negative appreciation / evoked ^c (i.e., 'token of') negative affect (fear)
<i>Won't touch—it <u>might cut/prick me</u>.</i>	
<i>No, (I won't touch) it's <u>too sticky</u> (food).</i>	inscribed negative appreciation/ evoked negative affect (dislike)
<i>We have to leave it cause it <u>might bleed</u>.</i>	evoked negative appreciation (messiness) or evoked negative affect (fear of pain)
<i>I don't want this [food] cause it's <u>cold</u>.</i>	inscribed negative appreciation / evoked negative affect (dislike)
<i>We don't want a big dog cause he <u>would licks on my tongue</u>.</i>	inscribed negative appreciation ('it's slobbery')/evoked negative affect (disgust)
<i>I don't like this 'cause <u>makes me sick</u>.</i>	evoked negative appreciation ('it's nauseating')
<i>I don't like this [cheese with rind on] cause <u>the little boys eat skin with cheese</u>.</i>	evoked negative appreciation ('it's baby food')
<i>Can't, I'm <u>tired</u>.</i>	inscribed negative judgment (weakness)
<i>I'm doing lots of names 'cause I'm <u>a big boy</u>.</i>	inscribed positive judgment (maturity)

^a ATTITUDE in examples is underlined

^b inscribed = explicitly attitudinal

^c evoked = implicit rendering of attitude

pattern, however, requires recognizing the possibility of 'evoking' an evaluation by representing a meaning not overtly marked for attitude, but which can be interpreted as having an attitudinal loading: in Martin's (2000) terminology, an ideational (i.e., representational) meaning acts as a 'token' of an attitudinal meaning. For example, 'it's cold', an apparently descriptive, factual, statement about a dish of food, is read as a token for 'it's unpleasant' or 'I don't like it', in the context of constituting an explanation for rejecting the food. These data therefore support Piaget's contention that causality is not at first construed between two objectively observable processes, but do not support his idea that the child is instead concerned with exploring psychological motives for action of the type: 'Mary cried because John pulled her hair'. It is rather that the child is initially construing causality as a way of intruding his or her own attitudes onto ideational experience.

A final, more oblique, example of how affective intensity prompts new moves in language development is illustrated by Stephen's first generalizing utterances; that is, statements about 'books', 'houses' or 'shirts', rather than 'that book', 'my house' or 'the blue shirt'. This is a highly significant move developmentally, enabling reflection on semantic categories rather than specific material objects and used in Stephen's case to explore the sometimes problematic relation between different observed instances of experience or between his own observation and statements he was told (Painter 1996, 1999). There were fewer than half a dozen recorded examples in Stephen's speech up to the age of three years, and in each case the conversation notably did not concern 'books', 'houses' or 'shirts', but was about an emotionally loaded topic, usually concerning children of a particular age status, as in *babies go in the pram sometimes* or *big boys don't cry* or *only little boys put on [the] edge*. In these cases, there is overt use of ATTITUDE resources in the mention of crying in the second utterance, but the issue of being a baby, a little boy or a big boy was also one of great emotional importance to Stephen and so became a site for cognitive exploration. It can be argued that the terms *babies*, *little boys* and *big boys* were themselves tokens of APPRECIATION or JUDGMENT and it was certainly the case that the move into generalizing involved sharing interest in an affectively salient content.

5. Patterns in the development of ATTITUDE resources

Having illustrated the general point that sharing evaluations is an important impulse motivating new moves in the child's early language development, a brief account will now be given of the initial development of the ATTITUDE resources themselves, considering in turn the three systems of AFFECT, JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION. This will involve more than an examination of adjectival vocabulary. While core examples in each system are likely to be realized by adjectives, these meanings may be realized in a range of lexico-grammatical forms and also 'evoked' (see earlier discussion) by realizations without overtly evaluative lexis.

As already discussed, AFFECT is the basis of the whole system, but there are precursors of APPRECIATION and JUDGMENT during the protolanguage phase. There is also evidence from many studies of first words that all three systems are represented in the initial lexical repertoires of toddlers, in choices like 'pretty' (APPRECIATION), 'naughty' (JUDGMENT) and 'like' (AFFECT). In what follows, each domain will be discussed briefly from an ontogenetic perspective, in order to throw light on patterns in development and the relevance of the categories proposed through SFL register studies.

5.1. AFFECT

Although I have argued that our adult language evolves from a proto-language which begins as a semioticization of affect, the shift into the mother tongue by no means heralds the burgeoning of affect-laden lexis, at least not in terms of the construal of qualities or states. As Lois Bloom (1993: 255) has observed in relation to a study of initial vocabulary of 14 infants:

The children's words—words like 'mama', 'cookie', 'more', 'no', 'up'—named the persons, objects, and other circumstances that were the causes and consequences of their feelings rather than the feelings themselves.

In the data collected from Hal up to the age of two years, AFFECT is not initially construed by adjectives apart from by the words *fright(ened)* and *cross*, the latter attributed to his mother in recall of a conflict between them. Similarly, in the data on 'emotion language' from five American children reported by Wellman et al. (1995), adjectival realizations were limited to 'glad/happy', 'scared/afraid', 'angry/mad', '(feel) good/better'. Another attitudinal adjective which was frequent in Hal's speech was *nice*, which the child Anna in Torr (1997) complemented with *yuk*; but these, together with *fun!*, have been classed as APPRECIATION since in their eventual use within the lexico-grammar they are attributed to objects and activities rather than naming a feeling directly.

Rather than adjectival descriptions of feelings, Hal's early language, like that of Anna in Torr (1997), the subjects in Bloom (1993) and those investigated by Wellman et al. (1995), chiefly used verbs in the representation of AFFECT. These included mental process verbs of affection (Halliday 1994), principally *like* and *want*, and other verbs which construe actions that result in pain or comfort, such as *bump*, *smack*, *hurt*, *kiss* and *cuddle*. More dominant in Hal's speech than any lexical coding, however, was the use of paralinguistic and non-verbal expressions of emotion.

In terms of categorizing AFFECT, work by Martin and his colleagues on a restricted range of (mostly written) registers has suggested three main semantic domains, each construable either as a state of being or a form of behavior. These are UN/HAPPINESS (e.g., 'miserable' to 'jubilant'), IN/SECURITY (e.g., 'distracted' to 'confident') and DIS/SATISFACTION (e.g., 'fed up' to 'engrossed') (Martin 2000). In the early speech of both Hal and Stephen, most affect expressions construe HAPPINESS or UNHAPPINESS, as shown in Table 5. Martin's three-way division has been proposed partly in response to observations of an infant's cycle of distress demands (Martin 2000: 150), and thus might be expected to be evident in the early stages of the mother tongue. However, although Hal's protolanguage did involve signs that were relevant to all three of Martin's categories (see Figure 1), his early lexical

Table 5. *Examples of early words inscribing AFFECT in the language of Hal and Stephen*

Happiness	Unhappiness	Security	Insecurity	Satisfaction	Dissatisfaction
AFFECT lexis: Hal, aged 1;9;0-2;6;0					
<i>like</i>	<i>bump</i>		<i>fright(ened)</i>	<i>(I'm) busy</i>	<i>want</i>
<i>kiss (better)</i>	<i>smack</i>			<i>(a minute)</i>	<i>hungry, thirsty</i>
<i>cuddle</i>	<i>(Mummy)</i>				<i>sore</i>
<i>all better</i>	<i>cross</i>				<i>cross</i>
<i>play</i>	<i>cry</i>				<i>shout</i>
<i>happy</i>	<i>hurt; cut</i>				
<i>(birthday)</i>	<i>(finger)</i>				
	<i>(doggy) don't</i>				
	<i>like (me)</i>				
Additional AFFECT lexis from samples of data: Stephen, aged 2;6;0-4;0;0					
<i>happy</i>	<i>sad; grumpy</i>		<i>rush away</i>		<i>sick</i>
<i>goody!</i>	<i>horrible</i>		<i>get (me)</i>		
<i>love</i>	<i>hate</i>		<i>shy of</i>		
<i>laugh</i>	<i>punch, hit,</i>				
	<i>scratch</i>				
	<i>kill</i>				
	<i>got a tummy-/</i>				
	<i>headache</i>				
	<i>fell</i>				
	<i>over/down</i>				
	<i>make a fuss</i>				

repertoire was not very elaborated: the dimensions of IN/SECURITY and DIS/SATISFACTION had few realizations and these were almost all negative in nature. It is presumably most pressing to express negative feelings explicitly (and thus seek to effect change), while positive affect can always be expressed non-verbally or loaded paralinguistically onto neutral or appreciating lexis.

Indeed the use of non-verbal and paralinguistic semiosis probably accounts for the fact that ideational construals can serve effectively from very early on as tokens of the child's affect, as shown in Table 6. For example, *Daddy coming soon*, said enthusiastically, or *Why he doesn't bath with me?* said in a pathetic tone, convey affect along with the factual observation. Expressions of APPRECIATION (e.g., *broken* or *it's a bit dead*) or JUDGMENT (e.g., *stupid!!* or *Daddy spoilt it*) accompanied by appropriate intonation or intensity also inevitably convey AFFECT along with the more differentiated meanings.

If we consider the contexts in which AFFECT is lexico-grammatically realized, the first generalization to be made is that it is usually the child's

Table 6. *Examples of tokens of AFFECT in the speech of Hal and Stephen*

Happiness	Unhappiness	Security	Insecurity	Satisfaction	Dissatisfaction
AFFECT lexis: Hal, aged 1;9;0–2;6;0					
<i>friend</i>	<i>ooh, sharp</i>	<i>Daddy coming</i>	<i>mind head</i>	<i>good fun</i>	<i>shoe stuck</i>
<i>goody!</i>	<i>broken</i> <i>it's a bit dead</i>	<i>soon</i>		<i>I'm looking at books at a minute</i>	<i>not hold Mummy's hand</i>
Further examples of tokens of AFFECT: Stephen, aged 2;6;0–4;0;0					
<i>birthday;</i> <i>Christmas</i>	<i>I don't want you to laugh</i>	<i>they don't hurt you</i>	<i>(might) prick; sting (me)</i>		<i>why I have to go this way?</i>
<i>no blood</i>	<i>Hal's not ever gonna</i>		<i>monster</i>		
<i>I got some lollies</i>	<i>play baseball with me</i> <i>he doesn't play with me</i>		<i>coming (thunder) only noise</i>		

own feelings that are construed, just as in the protolanguage. This can be seen also in the use of inscribed and evoked AFFECT in the construal of cause and effect links before age three, as discussed earlier. In the earliest period of mother tongue speech, however, there was one context which particularly promoted the naming of the emotions of third parties. This was the ‘reading’ of picture books. Here are some examples:

- (1) Hal, aged approx. 22 months
fright (pointing at picture of scared cats in story book)
cuddle, grandma (looking at picture of old lady hugging boy)
- (2) Hal, aged approx. 25 months
(looking at picture) is saying bye bye; crying; is crying; those ones crying too; all body cry
- (3) Stephen, aged approx. 30 months
He's grumpy; I'm not grumpy, I'm happy ('reading' Mr. Men book)
He's crying. (commenting on sad looking tiger in picture)
The animals all happy? (considering a picture in Snow White)

Here the children are learning the conventions of visual representations of affect as well as gaining experience in the role of affect construal in story telling.

The data from Stephen suggest in addition that after age three, there may be a new concern to understand and explore the affect of the dialog partner, as illustrated by the following examples:

- (4) Stephen, aged 3;0;2
 (looking at an information book and naming the animals.)
 Do you like the one (i.e., picture of snake) that's eating the egg?
- (5) (M refers to mum. S refers to Stephen aged 3;9;1. H refers to Hal)
 M: (in response to S) all right, my darling.
 S: you know Hal doesn't like to be a darling. (To H) Hal, why don't you like to be a darling? Hal do you like to be a darling? Do you like to be a angel?

On such occasions Stephen appears to be reflecting on the fact that his own feelings (here, feeling upset at the snake stealing an egg, enjoying his mother's endearments) may not be shared by another, a recognition of the individuality of personal likes and dislikes very much foregrounded in his social milieu (see Hasan 1993).

On other occasions, it was the relation between feeling and its behavioral manifestation that was probed:

- (6) Stephen, aged 3;6;5
 Mum, could you cry? If you fell down bump, really really hard, could you cry, or not?
- (7) (M refers to mum. S refers to Stephen aged 3;10;2)
 (M describes bad medical experience of S's uncle)
 S: Did Granny shout at the doctor?

The object of such questions by the child may be again to probe whether the adults share the emotional reaction he would have himself in such a situation, or Stephen may have been reflecting on the possibility that affect is experienced without being behaviorally expressed.⁵ In either case he is thinking about the construal of affect rather than simply carrying it out; thus making a further metasemiotic move of his own.

There is then no great elaboration of lexis to express feelings in the early pre-school period, but a continuation of the use of paralinguistic and non-verbal semiotics together with the verbal representation of outward behaviors that betoken inner feelings. As discussed earlier, however, sharing affect linguistically provides an impetus to expand both the use and the potential of the language in important ways: information-giving, creation of single word recounts and the construal of causal relations. Moving out from the protolinguistic expression of affect, the feelings of others can be named by the mother tongue and this occurs in book reading contexts more often

than any other. A later development is overtly to explore the affect of others in terms of individual differences and to reflect on the possibility of withholding semiotic display of affect.

5.2. JUDGMENT

In several ways, the development of the judgment system parallels that of affect. Again, the vocabulary developed in this area is not particularly extensive and initial lexical forms relate most often to the child's own behavior, just as protolinguistic precursors did. And like AFFECT, JUDGMENT was frequently involved in the early construal of causality, with book reading providing an important context for expressing judgments on third parties. One difference, though, is that because JUDGMENT is so centrally concerned with control, there are some occasions from very early on of judging others, since this offers the child an opportunity to be superior to the adult. For example:

- (8) (M refers to mum. H refers to Hal aged 1;11;20)
 (M carrying slippers, rests them on table while shooing cat from food)
 H: (delightedly) On the table; slippers on the table; naughty mummy!

The main categories of Martin's JUDGMENT system are shown in Figure 3. In terms of these categories, early language data involve both the domain of SOCIAL ESTEEM (i.e., evaluations of worth and reputation) and that of SOCIAL SANCTION (i.e., moral evaluations of ethics and truth) though only in relation to limited aspects of these. For example, within SOCIAL ESTEEM, it is not surprising that the domain of ability, or CAPACITY, arises early, having already been foreshadowed by protolinguistic signs of pride or achievement.




Figure 3. JUDGMENT categories (Martin 2000)

Table 7. *Explicit JUDGMENT vocabulary in Hal's recorded language aged 2;4;0*

Social esteem				Social sanction	
Normality		Capacity		Propriety	
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
	<i>poor</i> (in the sense of 'unfortunate') <i>funny</i>	<i>clever</i>	<i>(too) tired</i> <i>(I'm too) little</i> <i>(I'm too) small</i>	<i>good</i>	<i>bad</i> <i>naughty</i> <i>silly</i>

Within SOCIAL SANCTION, the very first area of judgment to emerge is predictably that of PROPRIETY (right behavior), rather than INTEGRITY (truth and honesty). In Hal's case, this was the use of the expression *badboy* at sixteen-and-a-half months, which has already been discussed.

By the age of two-and-a-half, Hal's explicit inscriptions of JUDGMENT relied on modals of obligation (e.g., *must*, *should*, *can*, *supposed to*) and the small set of descriptive words given in Table 7.

By the age of four years, Stephen's system of JUDGMENT descriptors was not a great deal larger. See Table 8.

However, tabulating the vocabulary available for judgmental inscriptions gives a false picture of the extent of the use of the semantics of JUDGMENT. In this area, there was considerable use of evocation, both through the use of ideational tokens and through the use of the system of APPRECIATION. Thus, by the age of two, recalled descriptions of prohibited behavior such as pinching or screaming, breaking things or chasing the cat stood as tokens of negative propriety in Hal's speech, whether or not accompanied by an inscribed judgment. Other people were implicitly

Table 8. *Explicit JUDGMENT vocabulary in Stephen's recorded language aged four years*

Social esteem				Social sanction	
Normality		Capacity		Propriety	
Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
<i>lucky</i>	<i>not lucky</i> <i>funny</i>	<i>clever,</i> <i>quick, fast</i> <i>strong, big</i> <i>good at . . .</i> <i>brave</i>	<i>(too) tired</i> <i>little, small</i> <i>not strong</i> <i>(enough),</i> <i>can't . . .</i> <i>properly,</i> <i>stupid</i>	<i>good</i> <i>nice</i>	<i>naughty</i> <i>a baddie</i> <i>rude</i> <i>cheeky</i> <i>silly</i>

judged when he spoke of them breaking or spoiling his toys. And assertions like *Hal fix it*; or *Don't need to hold my hand, I won't get lost* or *Jump by myself, not hold Mummy's hand* constituted clear self judgments of Hal's independence (i.e., POSITIVE CAPACITY) before he had any vocabulary to inscribe the meaning of 'capable', 'grown-up' or 'independent'. Similarly, recounting how he spilt his drink at the restaurant or dropped his Lego model were implicit admissions by Hal of negative capacity.

By the age of three-and-a-half, evocations of judgment in Stephen's language involved not only the categories of PROPRIETY and CAPACITY but also that of NORMALITY. Stephen explored this by reporting on his playmates' talk or behavior and observing the adult's reaction, for example, when he said: *Mummy, this is Frank at kindy. I'm not your friend; I'm Conrad's friend.* (grinning); or *Hey, all Tom wants to say is taxis and kangaroos!* The adult's response could be used to confirm or disconfirm his own assessment of NORMALITY. He could also use an ideational token as a move in argument, as when he said: *He didn't get dressed, he just had jamies on*, referring to his younger self, in challenging his mother's insistence that he dress.

As well as these ideational tokens, the system of APPRECIATION was used as an indirect means of expressing JUDGMENT (as well as AFFECT) and this was modeled in the adult speech addressed to the child. Where JUDGMENT judges the person as '(in)capable', 'clumsy', '(in)experienced', etc., APPRECIATION evaluates an object, task or performance as 'challenging, tricky', etc. Thus, by the age of two, mundane everyday tasks that Hal failed to perform successfully were routinely negatively appreciated by adults as 'hard' or 'difficult'. In such a case, the objects being acted on or the processes themselves are categorized as unmanageable, and the vocabulary of APPRECIATION becomes a token of negative JUDGMENT. This allows the child to fail without being explicitly judged or judging himself negatively as incompetent or immature. As will be discussed below, APPRECIATION is the domain of ATTITUDE that is least overtly interpersonal: because the evaluation appraises something other than a person, it appears more 'objective'. The middle-class child quickly learns that substituting APPRECIATION for JUDGMENT (or AFFECT) is a useful rhetorical strategy for distancing self-blame and constructing appraisals as 'factual' and therefore less open to challenge or dismissal.

The use of tokens reveals the JUDGMENT system to include more sub-categories of NORMALITY, CAPACITY and INTEGRITY than is evident from inscribing vocabulary, but it does not initially bring in the absent category of VERACITY. In these data, it is not until the fourth and fifth years of life that issues of deception become salient and only after this that truth-telling and honesty are talked about.⁶ What indeed is striking about the semantic areas

that are developed and most used in these data is their focus on [capacity], with positive capacity viewed as primarily involving physical strength, speed, size and stamina. Whether this arises inevitably from children's efforts to achieve mastery in an adult-sized world, or whether it is indicative of the shaping of these two children into masculine values, must remain an open question at this point.

5.3. APPRECIATION

The final domain of appraisal to be considered is that of APPRECIATION, which has already been described as broadly concerning the aesthetic domain, where a cultural object (such as an artwork), a process (such as a sporting event) or a field (such as philosophy) will be evaluated according to criteria relevant to the specific field. APPRECIATION is the area in which adjectival lexis—the canonical form of realization for ATTITUDE—is most evident ontogenetically. Yet at the same time it is the most problematic area for analysis, since it is here that the issue of discriminating between 'ideational', 'descriptive' meanings and interpersonal, attitudinal ones is most pressing.

APPRECIATION is the domain of attitude whose parameters are most contingent upon the particular fields under attention, but the world of the very young child is entirely that of the everyday and commonplace, which perhaps makes the discrimination between descriptive and evaluative especially difficult. One or two words in Hal's early vocabulary (from eighteen to nineteen-and-a-half months) would probably be accepted out of context as construing APPRECIATION; for example, *nice* and *pretty*. But it is less easy to make a decision about a word like *hot* which appears 'neutral' when said noticing the sun-warmed concrete but as realizing negative attitude when said on standing gingerly in the bathwater.

Table 9 provides (non-exhaustive) examples of appreciating vocabulary from texts provided by case studies of Nigel (drawn from Philips 1985), Hal and Stephen up to the age of four. In fact, the largest part of the children's adjectival vocabulary would be included in these lists, with only color and shape terms like *blue* or *round* or 'classifiers' like *plastic*, being consistently used without construing attitude. Other descriptors, for example, a size term like *big*, would be 'neutral' when serving to discriminate one of a set (e.g., *Which one is yours?—The big one.*) or characterize an object as typical (e.g., *big elephant*) or unusual (e.g., *big cat!*), but might construe APPRECIATION in specific contexts (e.g., *big ice cream* on contentedly receiving a substantial helping). The examples in Table 9 suggest, I think, that the children's task is to come to understand quotidian norms, to know what

Table 9. Examples of APPRECIATION vocabulary from eighteen months to four years

Selected examples	What is appraised	Positive/ negative	In terms of
Nigel: aged 1;7;14-2;0			
<i>too hot</i>	dressing gown	negative	sensory impact
<i>too far away</i>	tissues	negative	accessibility
<i>strange</i>	man	negative	familiarity
<i>wrong way up</i>	a triangle	negative	familiarity: orientation
<i>go very well</i>	toy train	positive	usability: functionality
Hal, aged 1;6;0-2;1;14			
<i>fun, good fun</i>	own activity, shared game, Mum	positive	entertainment value
<i>funny!</i> (in the sense of 'amusing')	breaking something	positive	entertainment value; familiarity
	'naughty' behavior		
<i>nice</i>	Father's hair (disheveled); rabbit tail	positive	likeability
	cat, book, food, pine cone, peacock, bath, stone, sleep		
<i>(bit) hot / cold</i>	food, bathwater, weather	negative	sensory impact: tactile
<i>sharp</i>	peg board, fingernail	negative	sensory impact: tactile
<i>soft</i>	cat, teddy	positive	sensory impact: tactile
<i>bright</i>	moon, star	positive	sensory impact: visual
<i>pretty, smart</i>	clothes, cushion cover, flower	positive	sensory impact: visual
<i>lovely</i>	soup	positive	sensory impact: taste
<i>noisy</i>	bike, birdie, daddy	positive?	sensory impact: aural
<i>wrong / wrong (way)</i>	toy assembly (nesting cups); being dangled by feet	negative	social appropriateness, familiarity
<i>(too) big</i>	various	negative	usability
	cup, drink, new shoes,	negative	usability; social appropriateness
<i>dirty</i>	clothes	positive	usability; social appropriateness
<i>clean</i>	clothes	positive	usability; social appropriateness
<i>broken</i>	cut off hair, torn page, toy	negative	usability: viability
<i>dangerous</i>	tools, blades etc.	negative	usability: safety
<i>(bit) heavy</i>	various	negative	usability: manageability
Hal: aged 2;1;14-2;6;0			
<i>hard; (too) difficult</i>	stiff light switch, getting shoes off; turning tap	negative	usability: manageability
<i>sticky</i>	hands, food, cup	negative	sensory impact: tactile
<i>yukky</i>	food	negative	sensory impact: taste
<i>clean</i>	teeth	positive	hygiene

Table 9. *Continued*

<i>lovely</i>	drink, balloon	positive	likeability
<i>hot; wet; dry;</i> <i>grubby; burny,</i> <i>prickly</i>	various	negative	sensory impact, social appropriateness
<i>dead</i>	creature	negative	viability
Stephen: aged 2;6-4;0			
<i>bad</i>	apple	negative	usability: functionality
<i>faster</i>	vehicles	positive	functionality, social value
<i>strong</i>	car	positive	functionality
<i>beautiful</i>	piano music	positive	sensory impact: aural
<i>scruffy</i>	bus, car	negative	sensory impact: visual
<i>smelly</i>	bus, traffic	negative	sensory impact: olfactory
<i>special</i>	toy, present, day, brooch, etc.	positive	likeability, social value
<i>enormous</i>	ship, grasshopper, rock	positive	social value
<i>magic</i>	various, including spaceship	positive	potency
<i>exciting</i>	seeing boats	positive	novelty

things are ‘supposed to be like’ in their world—that cats are expected to be smaller than dogs, that clothes should be clean and dry, that flowers are to be admired, that hair is combed flat, that trousers are a certain length and fast cars are more valued than slow ones, and so on. The attitudinal potential of the vocabulary is evident when descriptive quality words occurred with graduating modifiers like *too* or *bit*, making clear the sense of evaluation against some norm. In other cases, voice quality, intonation and facial expression evoke appreciation in an otherwise neutral utterance, as when Stephen aged 3;6;7 called his parents excitedly to *Come and look at the orange cloud*.

Three broad semantic domains of appreciation have been suggested by Martin (2000) from analyses of student writing in the specific fields of fine arts and English. Meanings can be grouped in terms of REACTION (e.g., ‘striking’ or ‘repellent’), COMPOSITION (e.g., ‘harmonious’ or ‘chaotic’) and VALUATION (e.g., ‘profound’ or ‘shallow’). The child language data are interesting in showing the ways in which these categories might apply in the appreciation of the mundane. For example, we can see that what substitutes for COMPOSITION in the first instance is the sense of familiarity or congruity with the child’s experience—a very general criterion, but with the potential for elaboration into more specific parameters as the child moves beyond the domestic sphere. Thus, the awareness of a logo being ‘wrong way up’ or of a person’s hair being ‘funny’ are at this point not evaluations made against any principles of design on the one hand or fashion on the other. They are simply observations of difference from the observed norm for that specific

object or class of object. Any more elaborated choices of COMPOSITION could only be built up in relation to more specialized fields.

It is not surprising, then, that REACTION, which is the domain least differentiated from AFFECT, is the most obvious dimension in terms of which the very young child 'appreciates'. Any appraisal in terms of likeability of the object or process comes into this category (*nice, lovely, fun*), as does the largest group in the data where the reaction is in terms of sensory impact of one kind or another. Since the business of being an infant so much involves taking in sensory data and construing it into meaning, adjectival lexis in the early months of talking is inevitably developed largely to name sensory qualities. When attitudinal evaluation is involved, this is predominantly to register the discomfort or pleasantness of sensations—*too tight, burny, sharp* as against *pretty, nice and soft, yum*, etc.

Table 9 shows that the other most frequent criterion for appreciating was in terms of the usability of objects, whether in terms of their inherent functionality or in terms of their ease of use by the child. Thus, a toy train is appreciated for its free rolling on its wheels, while an apple is negatively appreciated for being bruised. The functionality is in a sense intrinsic to the object here, since for a wheeled toy to be rollable or an apple to be edible is entirely relevant to its cultural categorization as toy vehicle or fruit. However, as discussed in the previous section, objects and processes may also be appreciated for the extrinsic 'quality' of being 'hard', or 'difficult' in relation to the child's ability to manage them. Finally it can be noted that in some cases, evaluations of usability relate neither to an object's intrinsic qualities nor its ease of use by the child, but in light of adult mores of safety and hygiene or appropriateness (e.g., negative appreciation of adult tools and dirty cups or shoes, despite the adequacy of their functioning, and positive evaluation of fast cars). Thus it is in terms of usability that we find the initial everyday expression of the category of VALUATION, which in the first few years of life begins to be elaborated to encompass values which do not derive directly from the child's own experience.

APPRECIATION, then, is the domain of attitude most elaborated in terms of the child's early lexical repertoire, probably because it is more distant from affective origins. Such descriptors are likely to be overtly 'taught' to children in naming games and other learning contexts precisely because they appear to be factual or 'ideational' in nature. It is for this reason, too, that appreciation terms may be substituted for more obviously 'personal' ones as a rhetorical strategy, as discussed earlier. Yet in perhaps the majority of cases of their use by very young children, this ostensibly neutral vocabulary is used with a definite positive or negative affectual loading. And gradually the child is encouraged to take on the social norms of the community in

giving a positive or negative social value to objects and processes according to criteria that belong outside the child's own immediate experience.

Conclusion

This account of the ontogenesis of ATTITUDE supports the recent interest by linguists in the area by arguing that the sharing of feelings provides the basis of semiosis itself. An examination of protolinguistic vocalizations indeed gives credence to the contention of Ellis (1993: 75) that 'the prototype of all statements is much more likely to have been *this is good* or *this is dangerous* than *this is triangular*'. Protolanguage systems demonstrate that expressions of AFFECT are 'gradable' even in their pre-lexical forms and that the differentiation of AFFECT into the 'institutionalized' forms of JUDGMENT and APPRECIATION may involve semiotic moves that encourage reflective awareness of the meaning system itself. Further than this, sharing ATTITUDE has a crucial role to play in language development more generally, including apparently ideational areas such as causal relations and generalizations, exemplifying further Halliday's (1993) proposed principle of the interpersonal 'gateway' to new developments (see Painter in press).

Not surprisingly, it is the child's own feelings and behavior that are mainly evaluated initially, and it would seem that developing rich and extensive vocabulary in the domains of affect and judgment takes place after the initial learning of language, and—given that sharing of books provides a significant context for the early verbalization of attitude—this probably happens for some children under the influence of literacy. At least until such time, paralinguistic features are necessarily of great importance in the expression of attitude.

The ATTITUDE categories devised to account for the semantics of adult English are vastly over-elaborated for the language of the pre-schooler up to age four, and there are few instances where a category has any extensive gradient of lexical realizations (such as *burning—hot—warm—tepid—cold*), although intensification of any term is freely used. Although all three attitude domains are represented from the beginning, it is not necessarily the case that Martin's grossest categories emerge first, with subcategories to follow. For example, the category of COMPOSITION within APPRECIATION and INTEGRITY within JUDGMENT are delayed due to social and cognitive immaturity, while REACTION and PROPRIETY are more elaborated.

In all areas, though, the system of inscriptions grows in tandem with the use of evocative ideational tokens. These latter depend on a shared perspective between adult and child and are also used by the child to provoke

an inscription from the adult, for example, in the area of NORMALITY within JUDGMENTS, in order to clarify what that shared perspective should be. The early age at which realizations of one attitude system serve as tokens for another is perhaps less predictable, particularly the substitution of overt appreciation for inscribed AFFECT or JUDGMENT. Taking into account the use of ideational and appreciating language as a means of evoking more obviously evaluative meanings allows us to see the extent to which learning one's mother tongue is inescapably a process of learning to perceive experience in the evaluative terms relevant to the learner's meaning group. Far from being on the periphery of language and language development, interpersonal meaning is at its very heart.

Notes

1. To avoid confusion between technical and non-technical uses of terms, references to APPRAISAL systems and their subtypes are in small caps.
2. See Halliday (1994: ch. 4) for a description of the English mood system. Developmentally, the instrumental and regulatory functions can be seen to evolve into imperative and interrogative mood forms, (with 'you do' becoming generalized to 'you tell'), while the personal and (aspects of) the interactional functions evolve into the declarative mood.
3. Note that some signs were short lived, and expression forms changed over time in some cases.
4. The ages of the children are described as follows: 1;5;22 (one year, five months and twenty-two days).
5. At this age Stephen had begun exploring the notion of semiotic misrepresentations and the possibility of misleading others (see Painter 1996, 1999: ch. 5).
6. Initially the child focuses on misleading semiotic displays as a source of cognitive interest and fun, rather than a moral question (see Painter 1999: ch. 5).

References

- Ackerman, B. P. (1983). Form and function in children's understanding of ironic utterances. *Journal of Experimental Child Psychology* 35: 487–508.
- Bates, E., Camaioni, L. and Volterra, V. (1975). The acquisition of performatives prior to speech. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly* 21: 205–226.
- Biber, D. and Finegan, E. (1989). Styles of stance in English: Lexical and grammatical marking of evidentiality and affect. *Text* (special issue on the pragmatics of affect) 9 (1): 93–124.
- Blake, J. (2000). *Routes to Child Language: Evolutionary and Developmental Precursors*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bloom, L. (1993). *The Transition from Infancy to Language: Acquiring the Power of Expression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Darwin, C. (1913 [1892]). *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals*. New York: Appleton.

- Dore, J. (1975). Holophrases, speech acts, and language universals. *Journal of Child Language* 2: 21–40.
- Ellis, J. (1993). *Language, Thought and Logic*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1975). *Learning How to Mean*. London: Arnold.
- (1984a). Language as code and language as behaviour: A systemic-functional interpretation of the nature and ontogenesis of dialogue. In *The Semiotics of Culture and Language*, vol. 1, R. Fawcett, S. M. Lamb, and A. Makkai (eds.), 3–35. London: Pinter.
- (1984b). *Listening to Nigel: Conversations with a Very Small Child*. Sydney: University of Sydney (mimeo).
- (1992). How do you mean? In *Advances in Systemic Linguistics: Recent Theory and Practice*, M. Davis and L. Ravelli (eds.), 20–35. London, Pinter.
- (1993). Towards a language-based theory of learning. *Linguistics and Education* 5: 93–116.
- (1994). *Introduction to Functional Grammar second edition*. London: Arnold.
- Hasan, R. (1993). Contexts for Meaning. In *GURT 1992: Language, Communication and Social Meaning*, E. Alatis (ed.), 79–103. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Izard, C. (1971). *The Face of Emotion*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
- Martin, J.R. (2000). Beyond Exchange: APPRAISAL systems in English. In *Evaluation in Text: Authorial Stance and the Construction of Discourse*, S. Hunston and G. Thompson (eds.), 142–175. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Painter, C. (1984). *Into the Mother Tongue*. London: Pinter.
- (1996). Learning about learning: Construing semiosis in the preschool years. *Functions of Language* 3 (1): 95–125.
- (1999 [2000]). *Learning Through Language in Early Childhood*. London: Cassell [Republished by London: Continuum.]
- (in press). The ‘interpersonal first’ principle in child language development. In *Language Development: Functional Perspectives on Evolution and Ontogenesis*. G. Williams and A. Lukin (eds.). London: Continuum.
- Phillips, Joy (1985). The development of comparisons and contrasts in young children’s language. Unpublished M.A. Honors thesis, University of Sydney.
- Stern, D. N., Hofer, L., Haft, W., and Dore, J. (1985). Affect attunement: The sharing of feeling states between mother and infant by means of inter-modal fluency. In *Social Perception in Infants*, T. M. Field and N. A. Fox (eds.), 249–268. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
- Torr, J. (1997). *From Child Tongue to Mother Tongue: A Case Study of Language Development in the First two and a half Years*. Department of English Studies, Monographs in Systemic Linguistics 9. Nottingham: University of Nottingham.
- Trevarthen, C. (1992). An infant’s motives for speaking and thinking in the culture. In *The Dialogical Alternative: Towards a Theory of Language and Mind*, A. H. Wood (ed.), 99–137. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- (1993). The function of emotions in early infant communication and development. In *New Perspectives in Early Communicative Development*, J. Nadel and L. Camaioni (eds.), 48–81. London: Routledge.
- (1998). The concept and foundations of infant intersubjectivity. In *Intersubjective Communication and Emotion in Early Ontogeny*, S. Braten (ed.), 15–46. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Trevarthen, C. and Hubley, P. (1978). Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year. In *Action, Gesture and Symbol: The Emergence of Language*, A. Lock (ed.), 183–229. London: Academic.
- Wellman, H. M., Harris, P. L., Banerjee, M. and, Sinclair, A. (1995). Early understanding of emotion: Evidence from natural language. *Cognition and Emotion* 9: 117–149.

Clare Painter is Senior Lecturer in the School of English, University of New South Wales, Australia, where she teaches courses in functional grammar, discourse analysis, and children's literature. Her research has focused on the areas of children's language development and educational linguistics. Address for correspondence: Department of English, University of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW 2052, Australia <c.painter@unsw.edu.au>.