|
Department of English Introduction to English Language Online Unit 12: Basic Discourse Analysis |
The purpose behind this unit is to raise consciousness about the way language is used and about the way spoken interactions are managed.
Our everyday use of language is generally automatic and unconscious. This is certainly true of spoken language. We do sometimes stop and think about what we are going to say, but in casual conversation this is unusual, and when it happens our attention is generally directed towards the general drift and organisation of our contribution to the discourse, not about the detailed wording of that contribution. There are, of course, circumstances in which we give careful attention to the wording of a message. If you are about to speak in public you will probably prepare what you are going to say, and this will probably include attention to the wording. Before you undertake a socially sensitive encounter you will probably give careful thought to what you are going to say - if, for example, you are about to give an apology and explain your actions, or if you are about to offer condolences to a friend who has recently suffered a personal tragedy. But these are the exceptions which underline the rule. The rule is that the production of spoken language is normally spontaneous and unconscious.
This makes the study of spoken language very difficult. As we shall see, conversations and other speech events are highly organised. But because language comes naturally we are not aware of that organisation. We need to make a deliberate effort to recognise that our use of spoken language is highly systematic and has its own system of rules and conventions. Linguists do this by looking for regularities in spoken language and devising systems to describe those regularities. In order to do this we must distance ourselves from everyday language use in the sense that we must question closely and systematically something that we normally take for granted.
We often think of communication simply as involving the exchange of information, but a moment's thought shows that there is a good deal more to it than this. In the first place we do not go around exchanging information gratuitously. If you were simply to go up to someone and say "It's ten past eleven" (or whatever the time may be), they would almost certainly find this disconcerting. They would perhaps reply by saying "What do you mean?" or "Why do you say that?". We do not simply interpret utterances - what people say - we ascribe purposes and intentions to those utterances and interpret them in that light.
In 1962 the philosopher, J.L. Austin, published a book with the interesting title How to Do Things with Words. Most philosophers at that time were very interested in saying things with words and spent a lot of time discussing the relationship between words and the propositions they expressed, the meanings they carried. They were very interested in the truth or falsity of utterances and in what we mean when we say that something is true or false. Austin, however, pointed out that many of the things we say are neither true nor false, nor are they intended to be true or false. In order to support this observation he began to tease out the notion of what he called performative utterances. When the judge says to a convicted criminal "I now sentence you to five years imprisonment" he is not simply telling the prisoner something - he is actually doing something, he is sentencing the prisoner. In the same way a priest who says "I now declare you man and wife" is performing the act of marrying a couple; a dignitary who, in the appropriate circumstance, makes the pronouncement "I name this ship Birmingham University is not talking about doing something, they are actually naming a ship.
The issuing of a performative utterance Austin called an illocutionary act. He went on to point out that although it makes no sense to speak of illocutionary acts or performative utterances as true or false, this does not mean that by uttering a set form of words we are necessarily successful in carrying out an act. You cannot simply look someone in the eye and say "I now sentence you to five years imprisonment", thereby successfully sentencing them to a period of imprisonment. And you cannot simply accost a passing couple with the words "I now pronounce you man and wife" and claim that you have actually married the couple. Performative utterances might not be seen as true or false, but illocutionary acts could, said Austin, be seen as successful or unsuccessful or, to use the technical terms which Austin coined, they could be seen as felicitous or infelicitous.
The next stage in Austin's enquiry was to ask what it is for an illocutionary act to be felicitous or infelicitous. What, in other words, are the felicity conditions covering a given act? You cannot, for example, sentence someone to imprisonment unless you are the judge presiding at that person's trial. Then the person must be found guilty before they can be sentenced. The crime must be such that a custodial sentence is allowed by the law. And so on.
The argument so far is interesting, but it does not impinge greatly on our everyday lives. I have never yet sentenced anyone to imprisonment, named a ship or married anyone apart from my wife. But Austin then went on to point out that very many everyday acts are achieved by performative utterances. When you say "I promise...", you are doing something - you are making a promise. What is more your promise will not be described as true or false, it will be described as sincere or insincere or, in Austin's terms, felicitous or infelicitous.
When you make a promise it may be an explicit performative, one in which you use a performative verb. In other words you make a promise by saying "I promise...". But we also carry out many illocutionary acts which are inexplicit. When the sergeant says to the private "Get your hair cut" he is carrying out an act, in this case giving an order. In fact an illocutionary act may be not only inexplicit, but also very indirect. When the sergeant says "If I was you I would get my bleeding hair cut", the private does not report this by saying "The sergeant informed me that if he were me he would get his hair cut." Nor does he say the sergeant advised or requested him to get his hair cut. From sergeant to private the utterance "If I was you I would get my bleeding hair cut" almost certainly functions as an order.
Another scholar, William Labov, listed the felicity conditions for an order
as follows:
(where S=the speaker, H=the hearer)
A. There is a certain state of affairs to be brought about and S makes some reference to it.
B. H has the ability to bring about the desired state of affairs.
C. H has the obligation to bring about the required state of affairs.
D. S has the right to ask H to take the necessary action.
(Labov 1972)
In the example we have given 'there is a certain state of affairs to be brought about', namely the cutting of the private's hair, and the sergeant 'makes reference to it'. The private 'has the ability to bring about the desired state of affairs' - he is, presumably, capable of going to the barber and having his hair cut. The private 'has the obligation' get his hair cut - the army has regulations about these things. Finally the sergeant 'has the right to ask the private to take the necessary action'. All the conditions are, therefore fulfilled. If, however, the sergeant had told the private to jump over a cliff then condition C would not have been fulfilled. If the 'order' to get his hair cut had been issued by a fellow private, then condition D would not have been fulfilled. Labov's conditions help to explain how we can carry out illocutionary acts indirectly. Given that condition D is fulfilled - the speaker has the right to ask the hearer to take the necessary action - then the command can be achieved by focusing on condition A:
Your hair look as if it could do with cutting.
What about getting your hair cut?
on condition B:
I don't suppose you could possibly get your hair cut.
Do you think you could get your hair cut?
or on condition C:
You're supposed to keep your hair nice and short.
Write your comments in the spaces provided and then click for feedback
Once you accept the relationship between saying and doing you can begin to look at communicative events and see how people use language to do things. Think for a moment about what teachers and pupils do in classrooms. What do they do? How do they do it? Your own experience of the classroom will tell you that teachers ask a lot of questions and pupils are expected to answer them. How far, then, is the following typical of classroom discourse?
Look at the following classroom conversation in the table below. To begin with, read it through and decide whether it seems complete. Does it seems likely to be a transcript of an actual classroom interaction? (Don't worry about the right-hand column for the moment.)
Comments on completeness/incompleteness.
We have a series of questions and answers. It looks from this as if classroom discourse is made up of a series of two part units. But I don't think the sequence rings true as a sample of discourse. It is actually taken from a lesson, but some bits have been missed out.
Here are some more bits that were said by the teacher:
Sausages. Yes. - A knife, yes. - Yes I cut wood with the axe. - Chicken. Fine. - We cut metal, yes we cut metal. - It's a saw, yes - Meat. Yes. - Yes, paper. - Fish. Yes. - We cut wood with that - It's an axe, yes - A knife, yes.
Can you incorporate these into the discourse above to make it a bit more realistic? You may like to attempt to type them in appropriate places in the left-hand column. Does it still look as if classroom discourse is made up of a series of two part units? After you have amended the conversation, click on the feedback column to the right to check what the original transcript looked like.
Certainly one of the commonest things that happens in the classroom is that teachers ask questions. But there is often more to it than simply asking a question. Look at this for example:
T: We cut metal, yes we cut metal. And, er I've got this here. What's that? Trevor.
You could divide this teacher turn into four parts. The first part - We cut metal, yes we cut metal - comments on the pupils' answer. The next three parts are all put together to ask a question. But the teacher first focuses the pupils' attention on what is to come: And I've got this here. Then he asks the question: What's that? Finally he nominates a pupil to answer the question: Trevor. The teacher's whole purpose is to ask a question. But in order to do that he has to hold the pupils' attention and he has to organise the turntaking in the classroom.
To summarise, we might take a small section of the discourse and divide it up as follows:
T: {What do we do with a saw? / Marvellette.//
P: Cut wood.//
T: We cut wood with that.}
T: {And, er I've got this here./ What's that? / Trevor.//
P: An axe.//
T: It's an axe yes.}
A description of this kind was developed by a research team in Birmingham in the 1970s (for a full description see Sinclair and Coulthard 1992). In technical terms they would have described the extract above as consisting of two exchanges (marked off by the brackets {.....}. In each exchange there are three moves, (marked off by double slashes //.....//). The opening move in the first exchange consists of two acts. The first act is What do we do with a saw. This asks a question and is described in the system as an elicit. The second act: Marvellette, is called a nominate. Its function is to organise the turntaking. The first move in the second exchange consists of three acts. The first - And er I've got this here. - was labelled a starter. Its function is to direct attention to or thought towards an area in order to make a correct response ... more likely. The second - What's that ? - is an elicit; and the third -Trevor- is another nominate.
By drawing up a detailed technical description of classroom discourse, researchers were able to identify units of description like exchange, move and act which enabled them to ask very precise questions about the nature of classroom discourse. Of course classrooms are particular places with their own rules of behaviour. But it has proved possible to extend the basic insights gained from the analysis of classroom discourse and apply them to other arenas.
Here is an interview between a student and her tutor. Can you divide this into exchanges using similar notations as those used in the previous activity?(e.g. //. { ) Many of the exchanges involve asking questions, but not all of them. What else is happening? Not all the exchanges have three parts. What other structures do you have?