It is customary, perhaps, to think of verbal communication, especially in its written form, as primarily a matter of self expression, as the means by which we, as communicators, externalise our inner thoughts and provide information we possess to those who lack it. If we subscribe to this view, we are likely to seek to explain the structures and forms of language solely in terms of the way they facilitate this function of `self expression'. Many linguists1 hold, however, that this view is too narrow or even that it is `wrong' to the extent that it sees `self expression' as the primary communicative determiner. In contrast, these linguists see verbal communication as primarily a process of interaction between the various participants who enact the communication process. Thus they argue that utterances, even in monologic, written texts, do not operate in isolation but are always conditioned to some degree by the verbal give-and-take, action-and-reaction of communicative interaction. They argue that all utterances to some degree take into account or respond to prior utterances, and, to some degree, anticipate or acknowledge likely responses, reactions and objections from actual or potential dialogic partners. Thus many utterances, even in monologic written texts, will contain elements which play a `responsive' and/or `anticipatory' role. Similarly, many writers, will include elements by which they explicitly represent themselves as responding to prior utterances and/or as anticipating likely possible responses.
This is a subtle and complex area of the language, much argued over by linguists, and we will return to it in detail in later sections. Let me, however, by way of brief introduction at least demonstrate how utterances can be, or can present themselves as being, `responsive' and/or `anticipatory', and hence as `dialogistic, in this way.
Here is a very obvious and overt example of what we might term `dialogic anticipation' by the 2nd Century Greek historian Polybius (or at least by his translator).
Some of my readers, I know, will be wondering why I have postponed until the moment my study of the Roman constitution and thus interupted the flow of the narrative. (cited in Crismore 1989: 9)
This, of course, is `dialogic' in this sense in that the writer presents himself as imaging how his readers will be reacting at this very point of the text and presents himself as responding to what he believes would be their voiced objections or questions had they been there, in the room with him, engaged in a face-to-face conversation.
But this `dialogic' aspect can be rather more subtle. Consider the use of the phrase `there is an argument, is there' in the previously cited extract. (The extract is from a radio interview in which the interviewer quizzes the Australian Prime Minister about the behaviour of the Australian banks in raising interest rates at a time when they have been making record profits. The Prime Minister, John Howard, is of a conservative/right-wing persuasion and therefore in favour of the `free markets'. He can therefor be expected to be generally supportive of, and reluctant to criticise, such economic `powerhouses' as the banks.)
There is an argument, though, is there, the banks have been a bit greedy I mean, the profits are high and good on them, they're entitled to have high profits, but at the same time the fees are bordering on the unreasonable now.
There is, of course, a backwards looking `dialogistic' aspect to the use of this phrase. The interviewer presents himself as `simply' taking up the words of some other, non-specified prior group of speakers. He represents himself as conveying `community concerns' rather than his own, individual views. By why distance himself in this way? Well, by such a device he indicates that this is a contested, debated assessment of the bank's behaviour - he acknowledges that this it is but one of a number of views currently in play in society. He thereby indicates that he anticipates that at least some elements in society will object to, and challenge such a suggestion. Presumably, the most immediate, likely source of such a challenge or objection is the pro-business, conservative Prime Minister with whom he is currently conversing, but there are other likely, if less immediate objectors and challengers - the banks themselves and their supporters. In this way, the interviewer looks ahead to likely responses to his criticism of the banks, indicating both an expectation that objections and challenges will occur and a willingness to engage with these objections and rejections. By representing the proposition as `arguable' in this way, he represents himself as not personally committed to this position and hence signals a preparedness to enter into debate on the issue. In this sense, he engages in dialogistic anticipation.
This is an area of meaning which has typically been explored in the linguistics literature under such headings as modality, evidentiality, hedging, boosting and meta-discursivity.2 For now, we can say by way of introduction that these dialogistic resources involve meanings which are `negotiatory' in that they are concerned with managing or negotiating interpersonal relations between the speaker/writer and actual or potential respondents. They are brought into play when the speaker/writer judges that some degree of difference or disagreement is likely or at least possible with his/her actual or possible communicative partners. They operate primarily by acknowledging that that there are alternatives to the current proposition, that there are positions which are divergent to greater or lesser degrees currently in play in the speech community. They do this, typically, by explicitly revealing the subjective basis of the current proposition as based in some individual opinion, assessment, interpretation or perspective.
1 The major influences for this dialogistic approach are Bakhtin (for example Bakhtin 1981), Voloshinov (for example Voloshinov 1995), and various researchers who have been influenced by the Bakhtinan/Voloshinovian approach - for example Fairclough 1992, Lemke 1992and Fuller 1995
2 For modality, see for example, Palmer 1986and Lyons 1977), for evidentiality see Chafe and Nichols 1986), for hedging Jakobson 1957, Myers 1989, Markkanen and Schröder 1997 and Meyer 1997), for `boosters' (Hyland 1996) and for `metadiscursivity', see (Crismore 1989).
