Such instances involve the writer/speaker indicating how they have responded emotionally to the person, thing, happening or situation being evaluated. Obviously they thereby take responsibility for that attitudinal value assessment.
The most obvious rhetorical function of such a use of Affect is to indicate an attitudinal position towards person or thing or situation which triggers the emotion. Phenomena which trigger positive emotions are, presumably, to be viewed positively and phenomena which trigger negative emotions are, equally presumably, to be viewed negatively. We are, thus, presumably intended to take a positive view or Anne Jones' commentatorial style by dint of the letter writer of extract 1 having `enjoyed' it, a negative view of the Norwegians by dint of the writer of extract 2 being astounded by their plans to hunt whales and a positive view of `Mel' by dint of the writer of extract 3 wanting to `adore' her as a friend.
But the rhetorical functionality of such meanings is rather more complicated than this. Such emotional assessments reside, of course, entirely in the individual subjectivity of the speaker/writer. It is an entirely personalised and individualised mode of evaluation and various rhetorical consequences follow from this. Through such `authorial Affect', the speaker/writer strongly foregrounds his/her subjective presence in the communicative process. Through this revelation of emotional response he/she seeks to establish an interpersonal rapport with the reader in the sense that, for the evaluation to carry any rhetorical weight, the reader must see this personalised response as in some way relevant, significant, valid, justified or at least understandable. Thus by the use of such Affect, the writer bids to establish an interpersonal bond with the reader to the extent that the reader agrees with, understands or at least sympathises with that emotional reaction.
This functionality can be illustrated by the following extract from a newspaper feature article in which the author describes her own experiences as the adoptive mother of an Australian Aboriginal baby. (affect values are in underlined).
As an adoptive family we have had pain and trauma, tears and anger, and sometimes despair. There has also been love and laughter and support from friends and extended family. My children have added richness to my life and taught me much about myself. (Sydney Morning Herald 4/6/97.)
By appraising events in such emotional/affectual terms, the speaker/writer invites her audience to share that emotional response, or at least to see that response as appropriate and well motivated, or at least as understandable. When that invitation is accepted, then, solidarity or sympathy between speaker and listener will be enhanced. Once such an empathetic connection has been established, then there is the possibility that the listener will be more open to the broader ideological aspects of the speaker's position. When the invitation to share the emotional response is not taken up - when the affectual value is seen as inappropriate, or bizarre or dysfunctional etc - then solidarity or sympathy will most probably be diminished and the chance of axiological concord diminished.
We can see this strategy at work in the extract above. The article appeared at a time when Australian Aborigines were calling for a public apology and financial compensation for the Australian government's previous policy of forcibly removing aboriginal children from their families and placing them with adoptive white parents. The policy had been described as a form of cultural genocide. A position generally supportive of the Aboriginal perspective had been widely adopted by the media and the political left and centre. The world view of the author of the extract was obviously at odds with this position, at least to the extent that for her the experience of raising two Aboriginal children had nothing to do with genocide and had not been grounds for shame and guilt. Her inclusion of Affect values of the type cited above can be seen as part of a strategy by which she was at least able to negotiate some space for her alternative, divergent social perspective. Her construing the issue in terms of basic human emotional responses could be expected to establish, at least in some readers, a sense of sympathy, a sense of common experiences and hence to enhance the possibility that her overall position in the article might be seen by readers as legitimate and well motivated.
What this means, then, is that values of Affect may operate with multiple evaluative targets. The speaker/writer may direct their evaluation, in the form of an emotional response, at some external entity or situation or they may, in a sense, direct the evaluation at themselves through demonstrating emotions which are likely to be seen as appropriate, or just, or at least sympathy-evoking. The two processes, of course, are interconnected - the writer/speaker can emotionally evaluate some third party while simultaneously presenting themselves for evaluation via that emotion.
