Aesthetic evaluation is not, however, confined to inanimate objects and states of affairs. It may equally apply to human subjects. Thus we may describe human individuals as `beautiful', `handsome', `ugly', `lopsided', `gangly', `striking' and so on. Such evaluations do not represent instances of JUDGEMENT because they do not involve assessments of behaviour - they don't involve normative assessments of right and wrong, correct or incorrect. Being `beautiful' or `ugly' in this physical sense is not a question of morality. Accordingly, such terms can't be slotted into the collocational frames outlined above. It would be incongruous to state, `It was beautiful of her to have such blue eyes'; `It was striking of her to have such red hair'. (It is important to note, however, that in the right context a term such as `beautiful' can take on moral associations and hence can operate as a value of Judgement. Consider, for example, `She was always kind, considerate and forgiving - truly one of the most beautiful human spirits I ever encountered.')
