Under Probabilise, I include all resources by which the current proposition/proposal is represented as just one of a range of possible propositions/proposals. It includes,
Such formulations have often been classified as `hedges' and have often been seen as indicating that that the speaker is uncertain or tentative. Within frameworks inspired by the concerns of formal logic, they are often interpreted by reference to notions of `truth-value' - they are seen as indicating that the writer/speaker declines to commit to the truth of his/her proposition. (See, for example. Lyons 1977: 452) Such interpretations all operate within a framework by which the communicative process is seen as a form of self-expression, a process by which the speaker/writer's primary purpose is to convey their inner thoughts and beliefs to the outer world. Thus, if a speaker frames an utterance with a formulation such as `it seems to me', then this usage is seen as necessarily revealing some aspect of the speaker's current state of mind, some condition of the knowledge or beliefs they are seeking to communicate - presumably the speaker's uncertainty or lack of commitment to truth-value.
From a dialogistic perspective, however, we come to see such resources rather differently. We see their functionality in terms of the dialogistic negotiation which all speakers/writers undertake. By the inclusion of an `it seems', a `probably' or an `I hear', the speaker actively represents the proposal/proposition as contingent, as located in some individual subjectivity, in some individual assessment of likelihood or of the available evidence. The utterance is thus construed as but one of a range of possible utterances, since different contingencies and different individual subjectivities may well result in different assessments of likelihood and the available evidence. Thus, by the use of values such as It seems..., probably..., I hear... to frame a proposition/proposal, the writer/speaker opens up the space for dialogistic alternation, for a potential response which in some way challenges or differs from the current utterance. In a sense, such forms acknowledge that such alternation is expected or at least possible and accordingly provide an interpersonally more favourable context for such alternation. Thus, as Hyland has observed ( 2000: 88) such formulations anticipate the affect that the current utterance is likely to have upon actual or potential interlocutors and, as Myers has observed ( 1989), reveal the writers/readers purposes in negotiating their claims with these interlocutors. By way of brief illustration of these points, consider the following extract from a linguistics text book on language learning/acquisition. Here the writer is arguing a case with respect to Genie (the young woman who, in a celebrated case, had been found to be almost entirely without language.)
What can we say, then, in answer to the question as to whether Genie acquired language, and acquired it normally? The passage from Curtiss quoted above shows that she thinks Genie had acquired language, but hadn't acquired it fully. It seems to me that we can barely allow Genie into the category of those who have acquired language, and certainly we can't allow her into the category of those who have acquired it naturally and fully. (Cattell 2000l: 199)
Here we find probabilising formulations (it seems to me, certainly) which are associated with assertions to which the writer is strongly committed - there is no sense of uncertainty, tentativeness, equivocation or lack of commitment. The formulations here operate with an obvious dialogic functionality - they serve to mark these propositions as points of contention in the current debate over language acquisition and hence as points at which a difference of opinion is expected from anticipated dialogic respondents.
